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it remanded the issue back to the district court for an explanation of the lower court' s
rationale.
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TH E PROPRIETY OF AN ADMIN IS TRATIVE LAW JUDGE CON S IDERING
A N INDIVIDUAL'S MOTION FOR MODIFICATION O F A D ISABILITY
CLAIM
A claim of mistake in a motion to modify disability benefits based on medical
reports created after the initial decision is a factual, rather than legal issue. Thus it
is proper for an Administrative L aw J udge to consider the motion.
Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. Campbell
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
59 Fed. Appx. 568
(Decided March II, 2003)
In I987, appellee Terry Campbell injured his head, neck, and back while working
for appellant Norfolk Shipbuilding and Drydock Corporation ("Norshipco"). After the
incident, Campbell continued to work for Norshipco from May I987 to January I993
receiving differing amounts of disability compensation. In response, Campbell filed a
claim for temporary total disability under the Longshore and Harbor Worker's
Compensation Act ("LHWCA"). After reviewing Campbell's claim, the Administrative
Law Judge ("ALJ") concluded that: (I) Campbell was not fired in retaliation for filing a
disability claim, (2) suitable alternate employment existed despite Campbell's limitations,
and (3) Campbell was fired from the suitable alternate employment for willful
misconduct. Accordingly, the ALJ rejected Campbell's claim for temporary total
disability.
Campbell filed a request for modification pursuant to Section 22 of the LHWCA,
which allows a compensation decision to be modified based on a change of condition or a
mistake of fact. Campbell alleged a change in condition and a mistake of fact with regard
to his ability to perform the light duty employment offered by Norshipco. After a second
hearing, the ALJ concluded that there had been no change in condition nor had there been
a mistake of fact. Campbell appealed this decision to the Department of Labor's Benefits
Review Board ("BRB"). The BRB affirmed the AU's decision that there had been no
change in condition, but remanded for further consideration on the issue of whether there
had been a mistake of fact regarding the alternate employment offered to Campbell. On
remand, the ALJ concluded that the alternate work offered by Norshipco was outside
Campbell's abilities and awarded him permanent partial disability benefits. After
subsequent appeals by Norshipco to the BRB, the ALJ issued a final order awarding
limited benefits to Campbell. After the BRB affirmed this decision, Norshipco appealed
to the Fourth Circuit.
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On appeal, Norshipco first argued that the ALJ erred in considering Campbell's
modification motion since it was based on a legal, rather than factual, contention.
Furthermore, Norshipco argued the BRB erred when it rejected the ALI's decision on the
merits rather than concluding that the ALJ exceeded its authority in reconsidering a legal
ISSUe.
In addressing Norshipco's contentions, the court first ruled that Campbell's
motion for modification was based on a factual contention. The court held that as
Campbell's claim was based on a disagreement as to the interpretation of medical
evidence, it was factual in nature. Furthermore, the court found that the BRB did not
reweigh the merits and substitute its own judgment for the ALJ's, but rather, remanded
the case for further consideration on an issue. Indeed, the court found that all the BRB
required was that the ALJ consider all the available evidence.
Norshipco next argued that the BRB erred in its findings regarding the available
alternate employment. The court found that no such errors existed as the BRB in fact
made no findings with regard to alternated employment. Again, the court alluded to the
fact that the BRB simply remanded the case for reconsideration on whether, when fully
considering all the available medical evidence, Campbell could perform the alternate
employment offered by Norshipco.
Finally, Norshipco argued that Campbell's appeal to the BRB was untimely filed.
In addressing this issue, the court looked to 22 C.F.R. § 802.217(a), which puts
extensions of time for such appeals within BRB discretion. The court reasoned that, as
Norshipco made no allegations that the BRB abused its discretion, Campbell's brief was
properly received by the BRB.
Ultimately, the court affirmed the decisions of the two lower bodies and granted
Campbell limited benefits for his disability.
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